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Creditor Rights and Corporate Debt Structure Around the World

By Kose John (New York University & Temple University), Mahsa S. Kaviani (Temple University), Lawrence Kryzanowski (Concordia University), and Hosein Maleki (Temple University)

In this study, we document that the strength of creditor protection influences corporate debt structures. Using data from 46 countries, we find that managers choose more concentrated debt structures and use more bank debt relative to other debt types in countries with better creditor rights protection. The choice of more concentrated debt structures in the face stronger creditor rights is made for two main reasons.

First, more concentrated debt structures increase the probability that a firm can successfully renegotiate distressed debt with its creditors. Therefore, concentrated debt structures can reduce expected bankruptcy costs.

Second, better creditor protection reduces the creditors’ monitoring incentives. The managers can form more concentrated debt structures to boost the monitoring incentives of creditors when creditor rights are strong. This monitoring is beneficial for the firm, as it results in higher firm value by reducing the problem of risk shifting (investment in high-risk, negative net present value projects by managers when a firm has risky debt outstanding).

We confirm our cross-country findings in a difference-in-difference analysis of corporate debt structure’s response to creditor rights reforms in Brazil, France, Italy, and Spain. The results are robust to various controls, alternative dependent variables, endogeneity concerns, and alternative estimation methods. Our sample consists of 25,700 unique firms and spans from 2001 to 2014.

The full article is available here.

Written by:
Editor
Published on:
June 6, 2017

Categories: Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, ValuationTags: Hosein Maleki, Kose John, Lawrence Kryzanowski, Mahsa Kaviani, risk shifting

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